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Churchill recounted how the war’s origins, from the British perspective, stretched from 1919 to 1939 as the world lurched ‘from war to war’ (Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume 1, The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell, 1948), frontispiece). That the aftermath of the Great War directly led to the outbreak of a second global conflagration is now almost universally accepted. Key factors were:
The perceived consensus for the origins of the Second World War were entirely centred upon unresolved tensions in Europe: the French aggressively demanding and enforcing extensive reparation for damage caused; the German antipathy due to the harsh surrender terms imposed that was so skilfully manipulated by Adolf Hitler; and the British desperately attempting to avoid another pitiful war through pursuing appeasement. These tensions were enmeshed in two ideological concepts that were causing serious concerns in all European nations – the growing rise of socialism emanating from industrialisation and urbanisation, and the rise of nationalism that had emerged from the demise of four great empires. A volatile mixture of both socialism and nationalism arose in Italy under Benito Mussolini’s brand of fascism – most visible when Italian troops invaded Abyssinia (the last independent nation state in Africa) in 1935, as this emphasised Mussolini’s imperial intentions. In Germany the mixed appeal of Nazism and Hitler’s dogged pursuit of Lebensraum led to war in Europe. Yet it was in Spain, from 1936 to 1939, that socialism and nationalism dramatically and tragically clashed as General Francisco Franco emerged triumphant in the Spanish Civil War.
Often described as a microcosm of the Second World War, the advent of the Spanish Civil War awoke the world to the realisation that ideological concepts like socialism and nationalism could be extremely dangerous if harnessed by demagogues. This realisation made Neville Chamberlain’s well-intentioned, yet foolhardy policy of appeasement all the more understandable. All of this helps to explain the origins of the war in Europe and Africa, yet it was conflict between Japan and China that dragged isolationist America into what became a ‘world war’ – a fact Churchill emphasised in his war memoirs.
The post-Great War distribution of German colonies in the Asia-Pacific inflamed already tense relations between Japan and China. Japan retained trading rights but not political control in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, while China, having joined the Allied Powers in 1917, sought restored control of these areas and the return of the administration of Shantung. The long-standing territorial dispute over Manchuria was exacerbated by the global ‘Great Depression’. In September 1931, ‘on a pretext of local disorder’, Japan invaded and occupied Mukden, the zone of the Manchurian railway (Churchill, Gathering Storm, p. 68). US sanctions against Japan were a direct result of American protectionist economics and were arguably a result of Japanese aggression against China – and frequently cited as the beginning of the road to Pearl Harbor. Refusing in the 1920s to renew the Washington and London naval agreements, and intent on expansion throughout Japan’s perceived ‘sphere of influence’, the Japanese Army marched upon China’s coastal ports in July 1937. America banned the sale of oil to Japan to halt Japan’s march across China, let alone the Pacific. Japan was therefore faced with either acquiescing to American demands, or proceeding to seize oil from the British, French and Dutch imperial colonies in South-East Asia. American support for the Allies had been vocalised since the outbreak of the European war in 1939. By 1941 however, more was needed and the American/British Lend-Lease scheme (where American arms were either leased, sold or exchanged for other supplies) started.
Most historians generally concur that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and Hitler’s response to the US declaration of war on Japan, turned the wars of 1941 into a ‘world war’. David Reynolds convincingly argued that the fall of France was the crucial factor which created global conflict: it caused near-panic in Washington; left Britain heavily dependent on America; encouraged the Germans to pursue military goals beyond their capability; ‘unleashed’ Mussolini; and revolutionised Japanese policy, as the already aggressive Japanese Empire further gained Indo-China in the wake of the fall of France. These latter three points reinforced the Axis relationship, and set the three primary Axis nations on a determined course to break up the ‘old order’ in their quest to establish a ‘New Order’. Arguably, two wars – one in Europe, and one that spanned the Pacific Ocean – were joined through circumstance. This was not lost on Churchill when, in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, he crossed the Atlantic to meet President Roosevelt, and remarked that a ‘new war’ had begun ‘with Russia victorious, Japan in and America in up to the neck’ (Sir Charles Wilson, notes, written aboard HMS Duke of York, 16 December 1941, in Martin Gilbert (ed.), The Churchill War Papers: The Ever-Widening War, vol. 3, 1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), p. 1631).
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This class contains a diverse range of papers, including notes and correspondence with colleagues, acquaintances and the general public, on topics of general interest, on party political matters and appointments to various positions.
This class contains material in connection with Churchill’s huge output of literary and journalistic work. Of specific importance is material which WSC wrote for the News of the World in 1937, as it illustrates WSC’s pre-war opinion of Hitler, Mussolini and on Japan’s aggressive expansionism.
This class of papers is a collection of Churchill’s speeches, his speech notes and, source material and dates from 1897–1945.
This class comprises correspondence and papers relating to Churchill's wartime premiership, from 1940–45, and includes: private office correspondence; personal telegrams; printed copies of personal minutes, telegrams and reports; correspondence relating to appointments and patronage; some family correspondence, and some engagements cards and diaries.