Working at the Admiralty prior to the First World War, Winston Churchill exhibited a number of positive and negative attitudes towards Germany. He admired much about Germany's modernisation and social reform programmes, but saw their naval expansion as a direct threat to peace. In calling for a two to one battleship construction programme in favour of Great Britain, Churchill also mooted the idea of a 'holiday' in construction - an idea not taken seriously by Germany. At the Admiralty, Churchill appeared to be in his element, both as a micromanager and a strategic thinker. In turn, the First World War justified many of his concerns about Germany and made him a man for his times. However, his tenure at the Admiralty became beset with difficult news at sea and culminated with the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign. An issue like Ireland concerned Churchill deeply, even as First Lord of the Admiralty, but it is dealt with in other studies.

Invariably, you can look at Winston Churchill's own published writing and published speeches for an exposition on world problems contemporary to his own life. This is true of appeasement, the Second World War and the origins of the cold war. It is also true of Churchill's tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty for the first time between 1911 and 1915. His volumes on The World Crisis, 1911-1918 (variously published, but first published as five volumes in six parts between 1923 and 1931) are a tour de force in explaining the importance of naval preparations against the onset of an impending war and the seminal events of the First World War itself. Intriguingly, the work started life as a study of sea power and was initially a work under the more unusual title of The Great Amphibian, but under his publisher's advice and a broadening of scope by Churchill, it became The World Crisis. [ 1 ]

In the late nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century the navies of Great Britain and Germany were symbolic of national power and prestige. They were also seen as crucial for the maintenance and development of empires and the close security of the North Sea. Anglo-German naval rivalry developed firmly with policies of naval construction inherent to the Naval Bills passed in Germany in 1898 and 1900. These were prompted by the desires of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (German Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy, 1897-1916) and Kaiser Wilhelm II for a prestigious German navy. They were united in their opposition to the existing stark British naval superiority. German and British naval expansion was also to be part of broader defence expenditure issues that concerned the European powers of Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy. A striking concern of the European powers was the possibility of a general war in Europe. Multiple reasons may account for the eventual outbreak of the First World War. In particular, international strategic arguments and domestic concerns of individual states are factored into many of the scholarly debates on the causes of the war. Whether or not the expansion in naval armaments is the dominant factor in the outbreak of the First World War, the British government and Winston Churchill perceived German naval policy to be aggressive and a direct threat to Britain's national security and the functioning of the Royal Navy.

Large battleships (often referred to as dreadnoughts and battle cruisers) became part of the Anglo-German naval arms race. The heavily armed British class of ship, HMS Dreadnought was completed in 1906 under the support of Admiral Sir John 'Jacky' Arbuthnot Fisher, First Sea Lord (later Lord Fisher of Kilverstone) and further dreadnoughts were produced in 1909, with the British adopting a programme in 1910 to construct eight new ships by 1913. These were developed by the British with improvements in speed and increased firepower. Ships with rather large guns (although the size of guns varied) and with propulsion by steam turbines tended to be known as dreadnoughts or super-dreadnoughts. British dreadnoughts were programmed over a long period of time but were completed in various classes in the following years: Bellerophon class, 1909; St Vincent class, 1909-11; Colossus class, 1911; Orion class, 1912; King George V class, 1912-13; Iron Duke class, 1914; Queen Elizabeth class, 1915-16; and the Royal Sovereign class, 1916-17. [ 2 ] The Queen Elizabeth class (which included the Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Barham, Valiant and Malaya) had been programmed as early as 1912-13 but delivered in the years 1915-16. [ 3 ]

Germany produced similar dreadnoughts, including: the Nassau class, 1909-10; Helgoland class, 1911-12; Kaiser class, 1912-13; and the König class. [ 4 ] The Nassau class (Nassau, Westfalen, Rheinland and Posen dreadnought ships) were planned as early as the period 1906-08 and indicate, alongside the British production of ships, that the naval arms race had materialised fairly quickly after the development of the first dreadnought. The Admiralty claimed in September 1912 that German naval expansion was not forced by British naval expansion between 1905 and 1908. It argued that it was not until 1909 that the British were forced into substantially increasing the number of ships they possessed. This response is explained by the fact that the new ships produced by Germany were cheaper to maintain and repair than some of the older ships held by Great Britain. It was also in 1909 that the Admiralty authorised a large review of the naval situation and British Empire security: 'In that year, 8 capital ships were laid down in Great Britain, and 2 others were provided by the Commonwealth of Australia and the Dominion of New Zealand respectively - a total of 10.' [ 5 ]

In 1909, Winston Churchill (President of the Board of Trade) was not as pessimistic about the German naval menace as the then Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, who was demanding an increased production of six new dreadnought battleships before a perceived crisis point would be reached in 1912. It was been suggested that the margin of British naval superiority would be adversely affected by publicly planned German dreadnought construction as well as secret dreadnought production and this would be particularly worrying for Britain by 1912. From Churchill's own analysis at the time, he believed four new ships would be sufficient for production in 1909 and two more might follow. The broader fear of the German threat nevertheless produced the result of a confused British expansion: 'The Admiralty had demanded six ships: the economists offered four: and we compromised on eight. However, five out of the eight were not ready before 'the danger year of 1912 had passed peacefully away.' [ 6 ]

What had become widely accepted in Great Britain was that the Royal Navy could not afford to lag behind Germany in battleship production or Germany would soon catch up with its naval superiority. Churchill recorded his recollections of his feelings on this in his own inimitable way:

There was a deep and growing feeling, no longer confined to political and diplomatic circles, that the Prussians meant mischief, that they envied the splendour of the British Empire, and that if they saw a good chance at our expense they would take good advantage of it. Moreover, it began to be realized that it was no use trying to turn Germany from her course by abstaining from counter measures. Reluctance on our part to build ships was attributed in Germany to want of national spirit, and as another proof that the virile race should advance to replace the effete over-civilized and pacifist society which was no longer capable of sustaining its great place in the world's affairs. [ 7 ]

Churchill's conclusion was that Germany wanted a great navy for 'malignant design'. [ 8 ] His analysis, derived from being President of the Board of Trade, led him to believe further that, despite his admiration for the social reforms undertaken in Germany, the German economy had been put under considerable strain by the naval expansion programme and this could create domestic unrest. The downside of this for Britain was that the German government might wish to alleviate the domestic economic and social situation by encouraging foreign adventure. An adage of international relations is that governments evoke the issue of external enemies to unite a nation-state in a nationalist cause, alleviating domestic criticism. In Germany's case it began to look like a self-fulfilling prophecy since some of the economic difficulties were being created by an expensive naval expansion.

Great Britain had a long-term policy of making sure that the strongest nation-state on continental Europe did not threaten its interests. Thus the concerns of Russia and France about Germany also became British concerns. Both France and Russia would increase their armies while Britain would develop its navy. The British strategy was to strengthen its relations with the powers, France and Russia, since they also perceived Germany to be a menace. Churchill's fears were particularly strong in this regard: 'Swiftly, surely, methodically, a German Navy was coming into being at our doors which must expose us to dangers only to be warded off by strenuous exertions, and by a vigilance almost as tense as that of actual war.' [ 9 ]

By 1910 and the following year, Anglo-German naval competition quickened in pace, with both Britain and Germany building battleships. With the Germans committing themselves to a large fleet of 33 battleships of various forms in the German Naval Law of 1912, the British believed they would be outnumbered in home waters. A particular worry for the British government was that if Britain were forced to withdraw from the Mediterranean, its world influence would be brought into question and decline accordingly.

Events in 1911 made it appear that a war between France and Germany was a possibility. France made claims to parts of Morocco where Germany appeared to have few discernible interests, the French believing that the Germans would at least be satisfied with colonial compensation in the Congo. Instead, the German government sent the Panther, a gunboat, to protect its interests in the port of Agadir in Morocco. To Germany's surprise, Great Britain was not disinterested and made it obvious that it supported France. The British cabinet appeared concerned with trade routes being protected and wanted to make it clear that any war between Germany and France would see Britain very much supporting France. The Agadir crisis did not escalate and a diplomatic accommodation, with France offering concessions, was produced, but this dispute suggested the possibility of a major conflict if France and Germany were to behave in a reckless manner. As Home Secretary (appointed 1910), Churchill's role was rather peripheral, but there was rarely a case in international affairs of the day in which he did not take a personal interest.

Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911 (a month short of his 37th birthday), having been offered the post by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith. In fact, Asquith and Churchill had discussed the possibility of Winston going to the Admiralty in March 1908, but despite the fact he felt it was the most 'glittering post in the Ministry' he accepted the Presidency of the Board of Trade on 10 April 1908. [ 10 ] Churchill talked himself out of the post in the Admiralty in 1908. He was not sure how he could influence the structure and organisation at the Admiralty and he wanted to impact on issues like finance, the administrative machinery at the Admiralty and the professional nature of naval service provided to the nation. Churchill clearly wanted to stamp his authority on the Admiralty, but he felt that was not possible at that time. Nepotism aside, he did not want the situation of taking over from Lord Tweedmouth, his uncle, and immediately having the embarrassment of suggesting radical change.

The naval estimates for expenditure and a building programme for 1912-13 were well advanced when Churchill moved from being Home Secretary to that of First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, but he believed that further counter-measures needed to be introduced to act as a deterrent to Germany. He reinforced his own view of an 'ever-present danger' of Germany:

Upon the wall behind my chair I had an open case fitted, within whose folding doors spread a large chart of the North Sea. On this chart every day a Staff Officer marked with flags the position of the German Fleet. Never once was this ceremony omitted until the War broke out, and the great maps, covering the whole of one side of the War Room began to function. I made a rule to look at the chart once every day when I first entered my room. [ 11 ]

This reflects Churchill's boyish enthusiasm for the job, but he was more than a clever amateur in his appetite for naval technical knowledge and strategic ideas. He was very quick to enlist the advice and views of the septuagenarian Lord Fisher, who initially Churchill used as an informal consultant, meeting and exchanging letters with him. [ 12 ] As First Lord, Churchill was responsible to Parliament for the Admiralty and had four Sea Lords under him. The First Sea Lord was the Chief of the Naval Staff and was initially Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, then Admiral Prince Louis of Battenburg (1912-14), to be replaced by Admiral of the Fleet The Lord Fisher (1914-15).

Naval supremacy for Great Britain was high on Churchill's priority list. Slightly mischievous in his public attitude towards Germany, he proclaimed in Glasgow in February 1912 that Britain's considerable navy was a 'necessity', but in contrast, Germany's navy was a 'luxury'. [ 13 ] Increases in the size of the German navy, evident in the German Navy Law, encouraged Churchill to press the British government for further naval expansion. [ 14 ] This British expansion, based on the considered German building programme, meant: 'Sixty per cent in Dreadnoughts over Germany as long as she adhered to her present declared programme, and two keels to one for every additional ship laid down by her.' [ 15 ] Here was a very strong commitment from Churchill to construct two battleships for every one that Germany could construct, a potentially rather expensive policy for the Liberal government. This he presented as part of the naval estimates delivered to the House of Commons on 18 March 1912. The strategic decision that Churchill was forced to take was to concentrate the British fleet in home waters and remove battleships from the Mediterranean, encumbering France with the responsibility to command the Mediterranean with large ships. This obviously tied the British more closely to French strategic decision making. As Churchill put it to his Prime Minister on 23 August 1912: 'we have the obligations of an alliance without its advantages, and above all without its precise definitions'. [ 16 ]

Winston Churchill also called for a naval policy for the Dominions that would deliver a flexible Imperial Squadron that could cruise the Empire and rotate through the seas of all the Dominions. [ 17 ] Churchill's approach to the building programme with regard to the Dominions was not to count any ships potentially provided by them. Any ships provided by them would then be additional and the efforts of the Dominions would more clearly add to Britain's naval strength. On the 14 April 1912, Churchill looked for guidance from Prime Minister Asquith to support a naval policy for the Dominions or, rather, a naval policy for Great Britain that would include the Dominions. [ 18 ] Whatever the disposition of a British Empire fleet in peacetime, Churchill wanted protection from the 'big dog' (Germany) in British home waters during any war; the fleet could then be redistributed again after a major conflict. [ 19 ] All administration including discipline and training would be controlled by the Admiralty, and Churchill expected the bulk of service personnel to be provided by the British in the early years. His idea was that a Dominion Squadron would proceed to waters where they were needed and could call upon docking facilities as required, for example at Vancouver, Simonstown or Sydney. [ 20 ] The Dominions themselves would have provided for their own coastal defence. Churchill felt that Australia and New Zealand were doing a great deal already and Louis Botha, the first Prime Minister of South Africa, would be very compliant. However, the Canadians would need convincing. The idea of financial support from the Dominions did take shape, although Canada's contribution of 35 million Canadian dollars did not materialise because of the defeat of the Naval Aid Bill in the Senate of the Canadian Parliament. This made a flexible Imperial Squadron unworkable and the onset of the First World War changed exact priorities.

Many domestic allies were won over by Churchill's dramatic pronouncements on naval expansion, including the Leader of the Opposition, and member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Arthur J. Balfour. Although hitherto sceptical of Germany's intentions, Balfour wrote to Churchill:

A war entered upon for no other object than to restore the Germanic Empire of Charlemagne in a modern form, appears to me at once so wicked and so stupid as to be almost incredible! And yet it is almost impossible to make sense of modern German policy without crediting it with this intention. [ 21 ]

Convincing the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, of the necessity of the Navy Estimates for 1913-14 was a more difficult matter, but Churchill was not short on advice for how the navy expenditure could be financed. [ 22 ] This was to further annoy Lloyd George in early 1914 when Churchill put forward his Naval Estimates of 1914-15. Although the Chancellor of the Exchequer's views suggest anguish on his part with the changing estimates produced by Churchill, the 'Welsh wizard's' wit was evident in his response to Winston: 'I now thoroughly appreciate your idea of a bargain: it is an argument which binds the Treasury not even to attempt any further economies in the interests of the taxpayer, whilst it does not in the least impose any obligation on the Admiralty not to incur fresh liabilities.' [ 23 ]

Against this background and in counter distinction to it, Churchill had earlier floated the idea of a 'naval holiday' with the Germans for the year 1913 (i.e. not building any ships in 1913). Three ships planned by Britain would be cancelled if the two ships planned for construction by Germany ceased to be developed. As John Maurer points out, the significant German politicians found very little merit in the idea: 'Kaiser Wilhelm sent Churchill a "courteous" message that a naval holiday "would only be possible between allies". To his intimates, however, Wilhelm was much less courteous: he branded Churchill's speech "arrogant".' [ 24 ] Had a 'freeze' in naval building come about it would have clearly favoured Britain's position in terms of the existing balance of naval power, even if it was presented as not further disadvantaging Germany. Germany might have been advantaged by British modernisation programme being held up. It still seemed paradoxical that it was the First Lord of the Admiralty who was promoting naval limitations, but this general proposal also undercut some of the more radical elements within Churchill's own Liberal Party. [ 25 ]

Unsurprisingly, the onset of the First World War in August 1914 rendered the notion of naval limitations a moot point. Churchill was thrust into an international crisis, the dimensions of which he clearly understood. He aptly told his wife, Clementine, on 2 August: 'But the world is gone mad.' [ 26 ] This was a response to Germany declaring war on Russia and a French declaration of war on the horizon. By 4 August the Admiralty issued the order 'COMMENCE HOSTILITIES AGAINST GERMANY.' [ 27 ] The ultimatum to Germany to respect Belgium's neutrality had been ignored.

Churchill's achievements during his first period at the Admiralty were admirable; his preparations of the fleet at the beginning of the war seemed sound. The relative strength in home waters of the British Grand Fleet and the German High Sea Fleet was in Britain's favour at the declaration of war:

	British	German
Dreadnought battleships	20	13
Dreadnought battle cruisers	4	3 and Blucher - described as 'almost a battle cruiser'
Armoured cruisers	8	6 (older)
Modern light cruisers	10	15

Source: Churchill memorandum circulated to the coalition government, 'The Naval Situation at Home', 30 May 1915, M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916: Part 2: May 1915-December 1916 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), p. 965, CHAR 13/58/18.

With building programmes, ships destroyed and some speculation on the value of older ships, Churchill could report in a document printed on 30 May 1915 that the situation of the British had improved in home waters and would improve further with the construction of new ships taking place.

Another interesting aspect of Churchill's tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty was his development of a Royal Naval Air Service in 1912. This service became useful in the First World War as it provided protection of ships, harbours and oil supplies, but it was also a contributor to the offensive strategy on continental Europe. It was not long before Churchill was asked to organise the air defences of Great Britain, giving him an unenviable workload, but aviation, particularly after flying lessons, enthused him even more than his passion for naval matters. In a clear stretch of the responsibilities of the Admiralty, Churchill embroiled himself in the defence of Antwerp in Belgium, having created an 'infantry' division from the navy. Although it was a brave attempt to defend the city against the Germans, the ultimate failure of his expedition made him appear rather rash and prone to excitable decisions. In a more considered moment, Churchill appointed his mentor 'Jacky' Fisher as First Sea Lord in October 1914 and, despite Fisher being seventy-three years of age, they appeared to be a formidable team leading British naval affairs.

Yet Churchill never escaped the criticism that he pursued a rather too vigorous offensive strategy in naval warfare. His role in the Dardanelles campaign, which resulted in the slaughter at Gallipoli, was to critically hound him for a considerable number of years afterwards. The audacious attack on the Turkish coast, combining land and naval support to force Turkey into a peace agreement, was a disaster. By May 1915, Churchill was relieved of his position at the Admiralty as Herbert Asquith formed a new coalition government.

The World Crisis only offers a partial account of the campaign against Turkey that led to failures at Gallipoli. In Churchill's defence, complex decision making was behind the failures at Gallipoli and Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, Secretary for War, Horatio Herbert Kitchener, 'Jackie' Fisher (who resigned in May 1915), the War Council, the War Office and many naval colleagues contributed to the plan and its failure. [ 28 ] The military pounding taken by Australian, New Zealand and British forces on the Gallipoli peninsular is perhaps what is most remembered about the campaign and by January 1916, 'some 46,000 allied troops, including 8,700 Australians and 2,700 New Zealanders, had been killed'. [ 29 ] Churchill became keen to prove that his detailed plans brought before the War Council in January and February 1915 had 'the strong support of the naval project given by you [Asquith], Grey, Kitchener & A. Balfour & Fisher's note of dissent'. [ 30 ] Disclaimers had also been made by Churchill at the time that without adequate troop support during the naval operations, then effectively he could not be held responsible for a military disaster. Churchill's defence of his decisions given at the Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry in 1916 was to prove a form of exoneration, with the published reports appearing in 1917. However, the detailed evidence given to the Commission was not published until 1968. [ 31 ]

Clearly, Churchill was not responsible for the whole Dardanelles campaign, but given his immense personal confidence and ambition, his sacking from the Admiralty and demotion to the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster (a job including appointing magistrates) was a serious setback to his career prospects. Although he retained a position in the cabinet and on the War Council for a short period of time, from Churchill's point of view his removal from the Admiralty reflected the ingratitude that could accompany political life. On 24 May 1915, Churchill's first tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty came to an ignominious close.

Churchill never seemed happy as the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and resigned towards the end of November 1915. His alternative choice was active service on the Western Front and he was appointed as Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers. Within six months he had fulfilled one ambition and returned to Westminster in May 1916. By July 1917 he was appointed by Prime Minister Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions, a job that again put Churchill in a position to contribute directly to the running of the war. Although this appointment would suggest Churchill had recovered from the political setback of the Dardanelles campaign, Clementine Churchill was to recount to Martin Gilbert the depth of the personal upset that leaving the Admiralty caused for Winston: 'The Dardanelles haunted him for the rest of his life. He always believed in it. When he left the Admiralty he thought he was finished ... I thought he would never get over the Dardanelles; I thought he would die of grief.' [ 32 ] Not only did Clementine capture the dark mood of Winston that followed this period in office as First Lord at the Admiralty, but her comments in a letter to Prime Minister Asquith on 20 May 1915 were to presage the future: 'Winston may in your eyes & in those with whom he has to work have faults but he has the supreme quality which I venture to say very few of your present or future Cabinet possess, the power, the imagination, the deadliness to fight Germany.' [ 33 ]

Martin Thornton, University of Leeds

Dr Martin Thornton is Senior Lecturer in International History and Politics in the School of History at the University of Leeds. He is the author of Sir Robert Borden: Canada (London: Haus, 2010) in the series Makers of the Modern World: The Peace Conferences of 1919-23 and Their Aftermath; and also Times of Heroism, Times of Terror: American Presidents and Foreign Policy during the Cold War, 1945-1991 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). He is currently writing a book on 'Winston S. Churchill, Robert L. Borden and Anglo-Canadian Naval Relations, 1911-1914', and has written articles on Churchill, including: 'Lester Pearson, the Commonwealth and Winston Churchill's Fulton Missouri Speech of 5 March 1946', Journal of American and Canadian Studies, no. 16 (1998).

Footnotes

1. 1. M. Gilbert, 'Preface', W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis [Abridged] (New York: Free Press, 2005), p. xvi.
2. 2. R. K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), Appendix, pp. 909-10. Massie provides a useful list of the displacement tonnage and the size of the main armaments of the Dreadnoughts.
3. 3. R. K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), Appendix, pp. 909-10.
4. 4. R. K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), Appendix, p. 911.
5. 5. 'Draft Memorandum for Publication', 20 September 1912, Admiralty (ADM) 116/3485/C430387, National Archives.
6. 6. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume 1 (London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 24.
7. 7. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume 1 (London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 24.
8. 8. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume 1 (London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 25.
9. 9. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume 1 (London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 26.
10. 10. Churchill wrote to Asquith on 14 March 1908 about their previous discussions concerning the Admiralty. On 10 April 1908, Churchill wrote to Asquith accepting the Presidency of the Board of Trade. H. H. Asquith Papers, MS Asquith 11, fols 10 and 59, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. Also, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 241.
11. 11. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume 1 (London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 53.
12. 12. Including: Winston Churchill to Lord Fisher, 2 November 1911, Lennoxlove Papers, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 2: 1907-1911 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1318; Lord Fisher to Winston Churchill, 2 November 1911, CHAR 13/2/6-9; Lord Fisher to Winston Churchill, 4 November 1911, CHAR 13/2/13-15.
13. 13. P. Addison, 'Churchill', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/32413. Also, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 563.
14. 14. Winston Churchill, memorandum to Cabinet colleagues, 13 February 1912, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1517, CHAR 13/17/3-4.
15. 15. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume 1 (London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 83.
16. 16. W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Volume 1 (London: Odhams Press, 1938), p. 87.
17. 17. Winston Churchill to Herbert Asquith, 14 April 1912, CHAR 13/5/18-22.
18. 18. Winston Churchill to Herbert Asquith, 14 April 1912, ADM 116/3485/C430387, National Archives; also R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), pp. 1538-40.
19. 19. Winston Churchill to Herbert Asquith, 14 April 1912, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1539, CHAR 13/5/18-22.
20. 20. Winston Churchill to Herbert Asquith, 14 April 1912, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1539, CHAR 13/5/18-22.
21. 21. Arthur Balfour to Winston Churchill, 22 March 1912, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), pp. 1530-31, CHAR 2/56/74-75.
22. 22. Winston Churchill to David Lloyd George, 8 December 1912, CHAR 13/13/154-159.
23. 23. David Lloyd George to Winston Churchill, 27 January 1914, Lloyd George Papers, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1856.
24. 24. J. H. Maurer, 'Churchill's Naval Holiday: Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race, 1912-1914', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 15, no. 1 (1992), p. 105.
25. 25. J. H. Maurer, 'Churchill's Naval Holiday: Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race, 1912-1914', Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 15, no. 1 (1992), p. 110.
26. 26. Winston Churchill to Clementine Churchill, 2 August 1914, CSC Papers, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1997.
27. 27. Admiralty to HM ships and Naval Establishments, 11 p.m., 4 August 1914, R. S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman, 1901-1914: Part 3: 1911-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), p. 1999, CHAR 13/36/42.
28. 28. Fisher's views included advice to Churchill, 3 January, 1915, M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916: Part 1: August 1914-April 1915 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), pp. 367-8, CHAR 13/57/37-38. Vice-Admiral Carden responded to Naval Intelligence Department reports with his advice to Churchill, 11 January 1915, M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916: Part 1: August 1914-April 1915 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), pp. 405-06, CHAR 13/65/5-7. Meeting of the War Council, 13 January 1915, M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916: Part 1: August 1914-April 1915 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), pp. 407-11. Sir Henry Jackson concurred with Carden's proposals on the Dardanelles in a memorandum to Vice Admiral Oliver, 15 January 1915, M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916: Part 1: August 1914-April 1915 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), pp. 419-21, CHAR 2/82/1.
29. 29. P. Addison, 'Churchill', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/32413.
30. 30. Winston S. Churchill to Prime Minister Asquith, 22 June 1916, M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916: Part 2: May 1915-December 1916 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), p. 1520, CHAR 2/74/8.
31. 31. M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1971), p. 200, footnote.
32. 32. M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1971), p. 473. Correspondence between Clementine Churchill and Winston Churchill during his period at the Western Front, January-March 1916, CHAR 1/118B/100-102 and CHAR 1/118B/78-79.
33. 33. M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916: Part 2: May 1915-December 1916 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1972), p. 921.

(c) 2012 Dr Martin Thornton