This essay examines Winston Churchill's relationship with the Islamic world by deconstructing misconceptions regarding Churchill's views of Islam. It takes a fresh look at Churchill's relationship with British India and the Middle East, and considers how Churchill's early experiences as a junior officer in India and Sudan shaped his perceptions and policies as a statesman. Moreover, the essay evaluates Churchill's relationship with the leaders of the Ottoman Empire, prominent British Muslims such as Waris Ali and British Arabists such as T. E. Lawrence. It reveals the extent to which Churchill was engaged with the Islamic world and suggests that his views on Islam were more complex than has generally been thought.

Winston Churchill did an enormous amount to shape the modern Middle East, yet relatively little academic attention has been paid to his relationship with the Islamic world. His military and political careers were often linked to matters concerning religious violence in the form of jihadists (those engaged in a holy war against non-believers), strategic calculations based around Islamic sentiments and Muslim civil rights. Despite this, a misconception has developed in Churchillian scholarship: that Churchill was little more than indifferent to matters in Islamic regions and that he was, in general, contemptuous of Islam. This notion comes from Churchill's reflections in his book The River War (1899), his history of the British/Egyptian reconquest of the Sudan, in which he himself had taken part:

How dreadful are the curses which Mohammedanism lays on its votaries! Besides the fanatical frenzy, which is as dangerous in a man as hydrophobia in a dog, there is this fearful fatalistic apathy. The effects are apparent in many countries. Improvident habits, slovenly systems of agriculture, sluggish methods of commerce, and insecurity of property exist wherever the followers of the Prophet rule or live. A degraded sensualism deprives this life of its grace and refinement; the next of its dignity and sanctity. The fact that in Mohammedan law every woman must belong to some man as his absolute property, either as a child, a wife, or a concubine, must delay the final extinction of slavery until the faith of Islam has ceased to be a great power among men.

Individual Moslems may show splendid qualities thousands have become brave and loyal soldiers of the queen: all know how to die: but the influence of the religion paralyses the social development of those who follow it. No stronger retrograde force exists in the world. Far from being moribund, Mohammedanism is a militant and proselytizing faith. It has already spread throughout Central Africa, raising fearless warriors at every step; were it not that Christianity is sheltered in the strong arms of science - the science against which it had vainly struggled - the civilization of modern Europe might fall, as fell the civilization of ancient Rome. [ 1 ]

However, the use of this passage to make broad claims about Churchill's lifetime position on Islam is problematic. It is important to note that he was going through a particularly anti-religious phase at the time he wrote this passage. It is also worth observing that these sentences only appear in this form only in the first edition of The River War, which ran for only one year until it was condensed into a one-volume text at Churchill's request. Moreover, Churchill was referring to the Dervish Muslims who were followers of the Mahdiyya, a fundamentalist and violent interpretation of Islam, rather than all Muslims, though he could have been clearer on this point.

Churchill reserved his most damning comments specifically for the Islamic Dervish population in Africa. In Churchill's A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Vol. 4, published in 1958, the Dervish Mahdiyya are referred to as 'restless fanatics' and 'fanatical hordes', which was in step with the thinking of orthodox Islamic authorities, or the Ulema, at the time. [ 2 ] This was because the term 'Mahdi' (or 'guided one') is the prophesized redeemer of Islam and is roughly equivalent to 'Messiah' (or 'anointed one') in Christianity. [ 3 ] By declaring himself Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, the leader of the Dervish Empire, was committing a heresy against orthodox Sunni Islam. To suggest that he was guided by the Prophet (and not the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire who was also the Caliph and, thus, the head of orthodox Sunni Islam), Mohammed Ahmed placed himself outside mainstream interpretations.

These considerations illustrate the need to analyse Churchill's life more thoroughly in order to fully appreciate his view of Islam. Churchill's earliest reflections on the topic can be found in his correspondence with Rev. J. E. C. Welldon, his former headmaster at Harrow School. On 16 December 1896, while he was stationed in India as a junior officer and undergoing his self-education there, Churchill explained his negative view of missionary work because 'Providence has given each man the form of worship best suited to his environment.' He elucidated his point by exploring the limitations of Christian influence, 'in nearly nineteen centuries [Christianity] has not spread South or East. In all that time no nation of Black or Yellow has accepted it. Centuries of missionary work in China have been barren! [...] Nor have the religions of Buddha - Mahomet [the Prophet Mohammed] - and Confucius gained a single white convert.' Churchill concluded that 'while religion is natural to man, some races are capable of a higher and purer form than others. I believe the Asiatic derives more real benefit from the perfect knowledge of his religion than of partial comprehension of Christianity.' [ 4 ]

This letter is significant because it illustrates Churchill's early ideas on religion, including Christianity and Islam. While his rebuttal was intellectually based on quasi-Darwinist concepts, it is remarkable that Churchill seems to hold Islam and Christianity as equals, each playing a part in the progress of civilization in the geographic region that best suits the religion. This was ultimately why Churchill thought missionary work was little more than a fruitless errand. The opinion was later echoed in Churchill's account of Islam in The River War.

Prior to his adventures in Sudan, Churchill was stationed in British India with the 4th Queen's Own Hussars. While he was there, he began to appreciate the importance of polo in 'strengthening the good relations' between Indians and Englishmen. [ 5 ] Churchill also praised the skill and tenacity of native Muslim and Sikh polo players. In a letter of 12 November 1896, Churchill told his mother that he would send pictures of a polo event and that she would be able to see him 'fiercely struggling with turbaned warriors'. [ 6 ] The 'turbaned warriors', Churchill later recalled, were the 'famous Golconda Brigade, the bodyguards of the Nizam himself'. [ 7 ] He even noted that 'Polo has been the common ground on which English and Indian gentlemen have met on equal terms, and it is to that meeting that much mutual esteem and respect is due.' [ 8 ] Underlining the importance of polo in his experience, Churchill argued that natives should be eligible for the Victoria Cross because 'in sport, in courage, and in the sight of heaven, all men meet on equal terms'. [ 9 ]

During this stage of Churchill's life he also considered fighting with the Ottoman Empire (traditionally viewed as an Islamic power) against their conventional enemy, the Greeks (traditionally viewed as a Christian people). Churchill was on a transfer boat going back toward India when the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 broke out and Churchill informed his mother that he intended to fight for the Turks against the Greeks, unlike his friend Ian Hamilton, a young officer on the boat with him at the time, who declared his intention to fight for the Greeks. There were several awkward dinners on the ship until they reached their post and realized the war had in fact come to a close, much to Churchill's disappointment. Churchill's support for the Ottomans was most likely influenced by his political leaning. William Gladstone and the Liberal Party viewed the Ottoman Empire as a despotic anti-Christian force which should be pushed out of Europe, while the Conservative Party, led by Benjamin Disraeli, saw the Ottoman Empire as an ally against Russian expansion in Asia. Churchill later reflected that Ian Hamilton was interested in classical culture and so went to Greeks, while Churchill 'having been brought up a Tory ... was for the Turks'. [ 10 ]

While Churchill was in India he became eager for glory and sought action on the North West Frontier. There he encountered fundamentalist Islam for the first time. However, the more time Churchill spent in India the more he realized there were differences between orthodox Islam and radical jihadist Islam. Churchill voiced his disdain for the leaders and clerics of the radical Islamic movement on the North West Frontier, such as Mullah Sadullah, in a dispatch for the Daily Telegraph on 9 November 1897 saying that the leaders' 'intelligence only enables them to be more cruel, more dangerous, more destructive than the wild beasts. Their religion - fanatic though they are - is only respected when it incites to bloodshed and murder.' [ 11 ]

While Churchill privately questioned the wisdom of the forward policy that brought him to the North West Frontier, he wrote home of the bravery and skill of many Muslims and Sikhs in several regiments including the 31st Punjabi Infantry with whom he fought. Churchill's 'letters and writings never refer to those on the same side as the British forces with disrespect and are almost completely devoid of racial epitaphs and common slang'. [ 12 ] Churchill later recorded his thoughts regarding his attachment to the 31st Punjabi Infantry in My Early Life: A Roving Commission (1930). Although he thought it was an odd experience because of the language barrier, Churchill recalled: 'Although I could not enter fully into their thoughts and feelings, I developed a regard for the Punjabis [...] If you grinned, they grinned. So I grinned industrially.' [ 13 ]

It is also remarkable that Churchill's praise and respect found its way to his enemies on the North West Frontier. Churchill recalled that the tribes there were 'a brave and warlike race [...] Nor should it be forgotten that the English are essentially a warlike people.' [ 14 ] Though Churchill furiously fought those who stood against the British, he sincerely admired their remarkable courage: 'It would be unjust to deny the people of the Mohmand Valley the reputation for courage, tactical skill, and marksmanship which they have so well deserved.' [ 15 ]

In 1900, Churchill won a seat for the Conservative Party in Parliament and then switched in 1904 to the Liberal Party. During the early stages of what may be called 'the liberal phase of Churchill's career', his relationship with the Islamic world often came to the fore. Churchill developed an ongoing feud with the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, Frederick Lugard, over his punitive expeditions against Islamic tribes in Nigeria. At one stage, Churchill's soon-to-be sister-in-law, Lady Gwendeline Bertie, even feared that Churchill might convert to Islam because she thought she had detected a 'tendency to orientalism' in his disposition. [ 16 ]

Perhaps the most striking display of Churchill's fascination with the Islamic world was his ongoing correspondence with some of the leaders of the Ottoman Empire. During a holiday in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1910 Churchill met Talaat Bey Pasha (who became the Ottoman Grand Vizier), Enver Bey Pasha (who later became the Ottoman Minister of War) and Mehmed Djavid Bey (who later became the Ottoman Minster of Finance), and they began to exchange letters. In fact, Churchill's relationship with Djavid Bey was such that during the Tripolitanian War of 1911 Djavid Bey wrote informally to Churchill about the prospect of forming an alliance between the British and Ottoman empires. Churchill wrote to Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, and reported that he has been contacted by Djavid Bey. Churchill further urged Grey to accept the alliance on the grounds that Italy had committed atrocities in Libya. Perhaps because Churchill was weary of the threat of war in Europe, he continued, 'Turkey has much to offer us ... We are the only power who can really help and guide her [...] Have we not more to apprehend from the consequence of throwing Turkey [...] into the arms of Germany.' [ 17 ] Another reason for Churchill pointing out the benefits of an alliance with the Ottoman Empire was his belief that the British Empire was 'the greatest Mohammedan power in the world'. [ 18 ] Churchill feared that the large number of Muslims in British India might develop conflicting loyalties should the Ottoman Empire find an ally in Germany.

However, Grey refused to heed to Churchill. It became clear that the Foreign Office wanted to send something 'mellifluous' but 'would not agree to anything substantial' despite Churchill's wish to send an 'encouraging' reply. [ 19 ] This course of action taken by Grey further pushed the Ottoman Empire towards an alliance with Germany. In 1914, when Churchill was forced to sequester two Turkish dreadnaughts, the Reshadieh and the Sultan Osman I, which Britain had been building for the Ottoman Navy, the Ottoman government was furious and felt that it had no choice but to ally itself with the Central Powers, despite several personal appeals from Churchill to Enver Pasha and others in power in Constantinople. These fell on deaf ears and on 4 November 1914 the Ottoman Empire declared war on the allied powers. Seven days later the Sultan and Caliph of Sunni Islam declare jihad against Britain and the Allies. When news of this reached Churchill, he became very fearful that 'the weight of Islam will be drawn into the struggle on the German side'. [ 20 ]

The fear of an anti-British political movement that called for the unification of all Muslims under one Caliphate (or a pan-Islamic movement) had been present in British foreign policy since the mid-nineteenth century, and it was a fear that Germany was keen to exploit. Aware of this, Churchill was concerned that any such movement might seriously affect the outcome of the war, especially in Asia. His personal notes continued, 'The Mohammedan influence in Asia will carry with it all kindred forces along in Egypt and along the North-African shore. It is in Asia, through Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, and ultimately India that England will be struck at and her crown of acquisitions cancelled out. India is the target, Islam is the propellant, and the Turk is the projectile.' [ 21 ]

This only served to embolden Churchill's desire for military action. He hoped to preserve British prestige in the East and put down any notions of an anti-British, pan-Islamic movement, so he pushed for operations in the straits of the Dardanelles in order to open a route to Constantinople. The result was the disastrous Gallipoli campaign and Churchill being forced out of the Admiralty.

After briefly serving in the trenches during 1916, Churchill returned to government, first at the Ministry of Munitions and then, from 1919, as the Minister of War and Air. However, the immediate post-war period saw Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Churchill at loggerheads over British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, particularly Turkey. Lloyd George was a famously philhellenic Liberal and his conceptualization of Asia Minor, much like that of Gladstone, was largely predicated on orientalist and biblical literature; whereas Churchill, who had originally been a Tory, remained relatively pro-Turk and sympathetic to their plight. The two figures shared a combative correspondence in the post-war period in relation to the development of a Turkish policy. Enver Pasha, one of the recently bested leaders of the fallen Ottoman Empire, wrote to Churchill in May 1919 urging him to appeal directly to Lloyd George on the Turks' behalf, saying: 'Knowing your personal generosity and your chivalrous influence on your colleagues, especially Mr. Lloyd George, I pray you intervene [...] I have never forgotten the benefits made to this country when you have intervened in our favour.' Remarkably, Enver warned of the risks in breaking up the Ottoman Empire and the effects this might have on the people of the Middle East; he even warned Churchill of the dangers of 'the deep fire of Islam'. [ 22 ]

As the situation became more volatile in Asia Minor and the Middle East, it became apparent that the antiquated and chaotic system of colonial governance, split between the Colonial Office, Foreign Office and India Office, was no longer capable of maintaining a coherent Middle East policy. The most glaring example of Britain's negligent foreign policy for the region was a direct result of three important promises, each of which proposed seemingly different arrangements. The Hussein-McMahon pledges (1915-16) supported Arab national aspirations, while the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) split the remains of the Ottoman Empire between France and Britain. Further complicating the situation, the Balfour Declaration (1917) stated that Britain would work towards the aim of establishing a national home for Jewish people in Palestine. Correcting this tangled and embarrassing fiasco would take a great deal of energy and drive. The overwhelming workload led to the retirement of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Milner, who did not want to take on such a worrisome task, and the position was refused by Lord Derby for similar reasons. This left Churchill as the foremost candidate and Lloyd George appointed him as Colonial Secretary in early 1921, giving him wide-ranging powers to develop a new department focused solely on the Middle East.

Churchill wholeheartedly flung himself into the task of creating the Middle East Department. He sent a flurry of letters on 23 January 1921 to Arthur Hirtzel at the India Office. In one of his letters he asked, in Churchillian fashion, for 'a large map of Arabia and Mesopotamia' that illustrated where 'all the principal Arabian potentates exercise influence'. [ 23 ] He also asked for expert knowledge to explain the various feuds and 'the principal doctrinal and ritualistic differences involved between the Shia, [and] the Sunni'. [ 24 ] Undoubtedly Churchill would not have been aware that the difference between the two major sects of Islam was not a theological difference but a doctrinal one. Essentially, Sunni Muslims believe that the position of Caliph, or religious leader, should be elected from among those capable of the task, whereas Shia Muslims believe that the Caliphate should stay within the Prophet’s own family, among those appointed by the Prophet, or among imams appointed by Allah.

Churchill's letters are important because they helps illustrate how he helped shape the framework for the discussion and conceptualization of the Middle East. For instance, it is significant that Churchill chose the title 'Middle East Department': the term 'Middle East' was still not official British terminology and was not often used in Cabinet social circles, with the notable exception of Mark Sykes who tried to 'popularize the term from the summer of 1916'. [ 25 ]

Churchill also enlisted a host of experts on Middle Eastern affairs for his new department. He appointed John Shuckburgh as Secretary and Major Hubert Young as Assistant Secretary. Both men were very sympathetic to the Arab cause. On the other hand, his adviser on military affairs in the Middle East, Col. Richard Meinertzhagen, was a fierce Zionist. [ 26 ] Churchill's most significant appointment to the department was the famed T. E. Lawrence. [ 27 ] Churchill immediately offered the position of adviser on Arabian affairs to Lawrence, despite apprehension from the Masterson-Smith Committee, the official cabinet committee that defined the parameters of the Middle East Department. [ 28 ] Lawrence greatly favoured Arabian self-determination, as Churchill had known ever since their first meeting at the Peace Conference in 1919. Bringing Lawrence into the department began an enduring friendship between the two men that had long-term effects on British policy in the Islamic world.

With his new Middle East department set up, Churchill swiftly called for a conference in Cairo to settle the issues between the conflicting Foreign Office policy pledges in the Middle East and to determine how exactly Britain might administer the region in a cost-effective manner. The Cairo Conference opened on 12 March 1921 at the Semiramis Hotel. It was attended by 'some 40 British experts from London and the Middle East', including A. T. Wilson from Persia, the High Commissioners Percy Cox (Mesopotamia) and Herbert Samuel (Palestine), T. E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell (Cox's oriental secretary and the only woman among the delegates), as well as several representatives of Somaliland and Aden. [ 29 ] This conference decided to structure the region on what Churchill called the 'Sherifian solution', which vested power with the Hashemite family whose patriarch was King Hussein. This ensured King Hussein would be King of the Hejaz and would be based in Mecca. It placed his son Feisal on the throne of Iraq and his other son Abdullah on the throne of Jordan (where his direct descendants rule today).

This solution had political advantages. Churchill believed that 'Britain could bring pressure to bear in one Arab country in which a Sherifian prince reigned [in order] to achieve goals in a different region ruled by another family member.' [ 30 ] For example, if Hussein knew his son's rule in Mesopotamia was dependent on his cooperation with British interests in Mecca, he would be more likely to oblige British wishes. However, this plan had major flaws as well. It placed a Sunni regent at the head of a country predominately populated by Shia Muslims and it misunderstood the nature of internal politics and rivalries in the Hashemite family.

Moreover, some of the policies of the Cairo Conference had major failings. The conference urged for the creation of an independent state for the Kurds (Kurdistan) but this was never realized owing to complications in Anglo-Turkish relations after the rise of the Turkish nationalists lead by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In an effort to keep costs low, the conference approved a scheme of colonial air-policing, which was quite brutal and indiscriminate, and helped create a lasting animosity toward Britain, especially in Iraq. Finally, the ambiguous nature of the Balfour Declaration regarding the creation of a Jewish land in Palestine was not elucidated in any way and this set the stage for an enduring international crisis and a legacy of violence.

It is important to note that Churchill's relationship with Islam was not limited to the Middle East. He had several contacts with Indian Muslims as well, especially during the 1930s during his campaign to keep India firmly in the grasp of the British Empire. Churchill is typically depicted in this period as a rabid imperialist whose belief in the civilizing effects of British rule served as his only motivation for opposing Indian home rule. In this narrative, Churchill is usually squaring off against the meek and well-intentioned Mahatma Gandhi, whose policy of non-violence helped make Churchill seem all the more fanatical about imperialism. Although Churchill did say that Gandhi was 'a seditious Middle Temple Lawyer, now posing as a fakir of a type well known in the East, striding half naked up the steps of the Vice-regal Palace', [ 31 ] the reality of this period is far more complex than this narrative suggests.

Churchill's views were influenced by ideas and people that reinforced his own imperial ideas. A good example of this was Katherine Mayo's book, Mother India (1930), which might be understood as having 'a profound anti-Hindu bias'; it concluded that mounting divisions and aggravations between Muslims and Hindus would end in a cataclysmic civil war and that the British presence in India was all that prevented such a catastrophe. [ 32 ] This further illustrates Churchill's Whiggish notion that since Islam shared Judeo-Christian traditions and monotheistic structure that it was somehow culturally more advanced to polytheistic Hinduism.

However, the most important influences that would help shape Churchill's defence of British rule in India were his various friendships with prominent Muslims such as the Aga Khan, Baron Headley (president of the British Muslim Society), Waris Ameer Ali (a London judge), Feroz Khan Noon (a future Prime Minister of Pakistan) and even M. A. Jinnah (the so-called father of Pakistan).

While the Aga Khan and Baron Headley connected Churchill to important pro-Islamic groups such as the British Muslim Society, the most influential figure, in terms of Churchill's thinking regarding the Muslim population of India, was probably Waris Ali. He and Churchill became good friends whose correspondence lasted into the post-war years and they worked closely together on the Indian Empire Society, which later became a part of the Indian Defence League. Waris Ali used his connections to keep Churchill informed on Muslim opinion on the ground in India and continually sent information that Churchill would then use in the House of Commons as evidence of the necessity of British rule. For instance, on 2 June 1931, Waris Ali wrote to Churchill regarding the Cawnpore Massacre and included material from the Crescent, a Muslim weekly in India, protesting about the terrorization of the Muslim minority. [ 33 ] Soon afterwards Churchill addressed an audience in Kent saying, 'Look at what happened at Cawnpore ... A hideous primordial massacre has been perpetrated by the Hindus on the Moslems because the Moslems refused to join in the glorification of the murder of a British policeman.' [ 34 ]

Furthermore, the aspects of Churchill's position that might be characterized as concern for the Muslim minority were informed by Ali and were evident in his portrayal of the Indian Congress Party, which he later said 'does not represent India. It does not represent the majority of people in India. It does not even represent the Hindu masses. Outside that Party and fundamentally opposed to it are 90 million Moslems in British India who have their rights to self expression.' [ 35 ] Churchill himself even implied that Waris Ali had influenced his position, saying to Ali that he had 'availed himself fully of [the letters and articles]' and that he planned 'to recur to him' if he needed more help in Parliament. [ 36 ]

Churchill's relationship with the Islamic world continued, of course, through the Second World War, when he sought to liberate Syria from Vichy France and worked with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia [ 37 ] and King Abdullah of Jordan [ 38 ] to secure the Middle East from the Nazis and their allies in the region, particularly the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammad Amin al-Husayni. One of Churchill's most interesting geopolitical strategies during the war was his efforts to keep Turkey neutral and then bring the country in as an ally in the closing days of the war. This policy reveals the extent to which Churchill's views on Islam had become fairly antiquated by the 1940s because he still assumed that having Istanbul as an ally would mean that all of the Islamic world would also join. While that was clearly predicated on Victorian notions, the remarkable thing was how serious Churchill was about garnering Islamic support. He personally directed foreign policy with Turkey, often meeting with President İsmet İnönü. In October 1940, during the darkest days of the Second World War, Churchill approved plans to build a new mosque in central London and even set aside £100,000 for the project. [ 39 ]

The war did not alter Churchill's view of India either. He continued to promote British imperialism in India under the guise of equal rights for Muslims and other minorities. This was evident in his telegram to President Roosevelt in March 1942, when Churchill argued that one of the main obstacles to India obtaining dominion status was Britain's desire not to break with 'the Moslems who represent a hundred million people and the main army elements on which we must rely for immediate fighting'. [ 40 ] However, privately Churchill had already confessed in the War Cabinet that he 'regarded the Hindu-Moslem feud as the bulwark of British rule in India'. [ 41 ] Churchill also wholeheartedly supported the creation of Pakistan, which would, in his mind, remain a dominion of the British Crown even if India became fully independent. Churchill continued his correspondence with Jinnah and they met for lunch at Chartwell in December 1946 to discuss the creation of Pakistan. Once partition began under the Attlee government in 1947, Churchill even played a role convincing Jinnah of the terms of the Partition. [ 42 ]

After the Second World War, Churchill's political life continued to be intertwined with issues concerning the Islamic world. Despite Churchill distancing himself from the Zionist cause because of the assassination of his friend Lord Moyne by the Stern Gang in 1944, the establishment of Israel in 1948 greatly altered how Churchill understood the Middle East. He saw the newly established Israel as an ally against Soviet expansionism in the region and as another means to draw Britain closer to the United States. Despite his support for Israel, Churchill also hoped that the new state would take 'into account the legitimate rights of the Arabs'. [ 43 ]

In his post-war government, Churchill was also confronted with nationalist movements in Egypt and Iran. Although these movements were not strictly motivated by Islam, Churchill continued to view the Middle East in outmoded terms as an Islamic region, despite the presence there of numerous other ethnic and religious groups, and this resulted in lasting colonial legacies in the Middle East. In Egypt, the tension between Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalist movement and the declining British Empire culminated in the Suez Crisis in 1956, while the Anglo-American operation to remove Mohammad Mosaddegh as Prime Minister in Iran in 1953 is cited as one of major causes of the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the collapse of secular democracy in Iran.

Despite this, Churchill's fascination with the Orient still showed through. He regularly took holidays in Marrakesh throughout the 1950s. The city's vistas were among Churchill's favourite subjects for painting, as were its Islamic inhabitants. [ 44 ] Churchill also enjoyed the evening feasts with the local pasha, known as T'hami El Glaoui (Lord of the Atlas), who had frequently played host to Churchill since 1935.

Ultimately, Churchill's legacy in the Islamic world is one of paradoxical camaraderie and shared interests gained through his experiences and personal interactions. It is through exploring his private correspondence and notes that this legacy becomes most clear. While strategic necessity certainly dictated aspects of his thinking, Churchill often held positions that he believed gave the Muslim subjects of the Crown a good deal. There were moments, of course, when this alliance did not harmonize. Two major failures of Churchill's career concerned the Islamic world. First, there was the setback over Gallipoli and, second, his inflexible attitudes regarding India in the 1930s. Although Churchill's view of political and cultural Islam was, to some extent, a Victorian construction from which that he never fully divorced himself, and his typical position on matters related to Islamic regions was imperialistic, he saw British power as a means to advance civilization, which he ultimately believed helped everyone, including Muslims. Although Churchill's views of Islam can in many ways seem patronizing and problematic, they were nonetheless a great deal more nuanced and sympathetic than is generally appreciated.

Warren Dockter, University of Cambridge

Warren Dockter is Research Fellow at Clare Hall, University of Cambridge. A graduate of the University of Tennessee, he gained his PhD at the University of Nottingham and has taught at the University of Exeter and the University of Worcester, UK. He is the author of Winston Churchill and the Islamic World: Orientalism, Empire and Diplomacy in the Middle East. His research interest lies in British imperialism in the Middle East during the late nineteenth and twentieth century, encapsulating orientalism and transnational historical approaches.

Footnotes

1. 1. Winston S. Churchill, The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of Soudan, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1899), Vol. II, pp. 248-50. For a proof of the 1902 revised edition of The River War, from which the section was omitted, see CHAR 8/4, images 63-206; and for source material and drafts see CHAR 8/5A-B.
2. 2. Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: Volume 4: The Great Democracies (London: Cassell, 1958), pp. 341, 369. It is possible that these terms were originated by Churchill's literary assistants, but the text would necessarily have been approved by Churchill. For traditional Islamic opinion of the Mahdiyya see Heather Harkey, 'Ahmad Zayni Dahlan's "Al-Futuhat Al-Islamiyya": A Contemporary View of the Sudanese Mahdi', Sudanic Africa: A Journal of Historical Sources, Vol. 5 (1994), pp. 67-75.
3. 3. According to tradition, the 'Mahdi' acts as something of a steward for a period of years until the final return of the Messiah and together they rid the world of evil. Belief in the Mahdi is more prevalent in Shia Islam. See Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
4. 4. Winston Churchill to J. E. C. Welldon, 16 December 1896, CHAR 28/152A/85-86.
5. 5. Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force (Rockville, MD: Wildside Press, 2005), p. 188
6. 6. Winston Churchill to Lady Randolph Churchill, 12 November 1896, CHAR 28/22/24-25.
7. 7. Winston S. Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (London: T. Butterworth, 1930), p. 119.
8. 8. Churchill, My Early Life, p. 188.
9. 9. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force, p. 90.
10. 10. Churchill, My Early Life, p. 121.
11. 11. Winston Churchill, field dispatch from Inayat Kila, 9 November 1897, in Frederick Woods, Young Winston's Wars (London: Leo Cooper, 1972), p. 39.
12. 12. Douglas Russell, Winston Churchill: Soldier - The Military Life of a Gentleman at War (London: Brassey's, 2005), p. 147.
13. 13. Churchill, My Early Life, pp. 148-9.
14. 14. Winston Churchill, field dispatch from Inayat Kila, 9 November 1897, in Woods, Young Winston's Wars, pp. 52-7.
15. 15. Winston Churchill, field dispatch from Inayat Kila, 16 November 1897 in Woods, Young Winston's Wars, p. 52.
16. 16. Lady Gwendeline Bertie to Winston Churchill, 27 August 1907, CHAR 1/66/15.
17. 17. Winston Churchill to Sir Edward Grey, 4 November 1911, in Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II: Young Statesman: 1901-1914 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 1369-70.
18. 18. Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume II, Vol. II, pp. 1369-70.
19. 19. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Volume III: The Challenge of War, 1914-1916 (London: Minerva, 1990), p. 190.
20. 20. Winston Churchill, personal notes, January 1916, CHAR 2/71/6-9.
21. 21. Winston Churchill, personal notes, January 1916, CHAR 2/71/6-9.
22. 22. Enver Pasha to Winston Churchill, 3 May 1919, CHAR 16/7/23-25.
23. 23. Winston Churchill to Arthur Hirtzel, 23 January 1921, in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume IV: Part 2: July 1919-March 1921 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1977), pp. 1320-21.
24. 24. Winston Churchill to Arthur Hirtzel, 23 January 1921, in Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Companion Volume IV: Part 2, pp. 1320-1.
25. 25. James Renton, 'Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East 1917-1918', Historical Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3 (September 2007), p. 653.
26. 26. Meinertzhagen is not always a reliable source as he fabricated several elements surrounding his life. For more information see Brian Garfield, The Meinertzhagen Mystery (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007); N. J. Lockman, Meinertzhagen's Diary Ruse (Ann Arbor, MI: Falcon, 1995); P. H. Capstick, Warrior: The Legend of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen (London: St Martin's Press, 1998).
27. 27. For more on T. E. Lawrence see T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Oxford: privately printed, 1922); Richard Perceval Graves, Lawrence of Arabia and His World (London: Thames & Hudson, 1976); Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T. E. Lawrence (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1989); David Garnett (ed.), The Letters of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia (London: Spring Books, 1964).
28. 28. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Volume IV: World in Torment, 1916-1922 (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1975), p. 510; David Fromkin, The Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1989), p. 497.
29. 29. Timothy J. Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule 1920-1925: The Sherifian Solution (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 137. For more on Gertrude Bell see Janet Wallach, The Desert Queen: The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell (London: Anchor, 1996); Gertrude Bell, The Letters of Gertrude Bell (London: Ernest Benn, 1927).
30. 30. Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, p. 2.
31. 31. Winston Churchill, Speech at Winchester House, 23 February 1931, CHAR 9/95/34-46.
32. 32. Richard Toye, Churchill's Empire: The World that Made Him and the World He Made (London: Macmillan, 2010), p. 173.
33. 33. Waris Ali to Winston Churchill, 2 June 1931, CHAR 2/180B/175; Crescent subscriber letter, [April] 1931, CHAR 2/180B/176; 'The Cawnpore Debate', Crescent, 12 April 1931, CHAR 2/180B/177.
34. 34. Winston Churchill, 'India: Government Policy' speech, 10 June 1931, in James Robert Rhodes (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963 (New York: Bowker, 1974), Vol. 5, pp. 5044-8. Waris Ali wrote to Churchill explaining 'all Muslims and Law abiding people in India' will thank Churchill for his move to debate the Cawnpore riots in the House of Commons. Waris Ali to Winston Churchill, 2 June 1931, CHAR 2/180B/175.
35. 35. Arthur Herman, Gandhi and Churchill (London: Hutchinson, 2008), p. 562.
36. 36. Winston Churchill to Waris Ali, 3 June 1931, CHAR 2/180B/180.
37. 37. See Winston Churchill to Abdul Aziz bin Saud, 16 May 1945, CHAR 20/227B/194-196.
38. 38. See Winston Churchill to Abdullah bin Hussain, 24 October 1944, CHAR 20/138B/136-137.
39. 39. See Cabinet Minutes, 24 October 1940, CAB 65/9/38, National Archives, Kew, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C9110640.
40. 40. Winston Churchill to President Roosevelt, 4 March 1942, CHAR 20/71A/27. On this point Churchill was undoubtedly misinformed: by January 1941 the Indian Army's total strength was about 418,000, with 37 per cent Muslim and 55 per cent Hindu. See James Lawrence, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (London: Abacus, 1998), p. 542.
41. 41. Winston Churchill, War Cabinet minutes, 2 February 1940; Winston S. Churchill, WP, Vol. 1, pp. 715-16.
42. 42. See Alex von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire (London: Henry Holt, 2007), pp. 148, 168.
43. 43. Winston Churchill, speech at the House of Commons, 10 December 1948, in James Robert Rhodes (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897-1963 (New York: Bowker, 1974), Vol. 7, p. 7766 and CHUR 5/22B/302-352.
44. 44. For examples of Churchill's paintings of Marrakesh and elsewhere in the Middle East, see David Coombs with Minnie Churchill, Sir Winston Churchill's Life Through His Paintings (London: Chaucer Press, 2003). Churchill painted more than twenty artworks of Middle Eastern scenes, including at least seven that specifically focus on the bazaars and markets of Marrakesh.

(c) 2015 Warren Dockter